Needless to say, there is no question of even starting to list what I omitted{ sometimes to my great regret, although I realize that such hollow apologies just reverberate in the vast emptiness I have created 1 .
Therefore, let's get physical and say something concrete about what is in this paper. According to me, there are three landmark publications in Realizability. ( 40] ) Of these three, both 1) and 3) initiated a whole new strand of research. I have therefore decided that the material I wished to present, naturally divides into two periods, viz. 1940{1980 and 1980{2000. This is not to say that suddenly there were, after 1980, no more purely syntactical presentations of Realizabilities (quite on the contrary, thanks to Computer Science syntax is back!), but I do feel that although many of these matters still need and deserve to be investigated (and need all the elegance and expository skills we can muster), no radically new vistas have emerged from this research. Therefore, in my account of the second period I have concentrated on what I regard as more innovative research.
The second item in my list is of a di erent kind. This monumental work brought together all existing results, many of which were due to its author, and ordered them in such a way that the diligent student could see at once the similarities between them. It charted the territory, and in this way achieved something of conceptual value: the notion that all these systems, interpretations and axiomatizations were manifestations of a pattern that they had in common. What exactly this pattern is, we still don't know. But it is my feeling that the categorical analyses of later years owe a lot to this work.
It made, when it appeared, a`daunting' impression on some people. And it certainly did so on me when I was Troelstra's student. But now I experience a sensation of dry, austere beauty in its relentless pursuit of order. And let us not forget it set new standards of presentation and notation. For although Kleene's rst paper is a gem of readability, regrettably Kleene later adopted a style of writing which was so cluttered with notation that it takes a strong man to ght through it.
I have therefore decided to dedicate this paper to Anne Troelstra, my mentor who has contributed so much to the subject matter, in gratitude.
I am also very much indebted to a number of anonymous referees whose careful reading of the rst draft of this paper uncovered a number of inaccuracies, and who did valuable suggestions for improvement of the text. 1 The rst 40 years: 1940-1980 
The origin of Realizability
In his overview paper: \Realizability: a retrospective survey" ( 58] ), Stephen Cole Kleene recounts how his idea for numerical realizability developed. He wished to give some precise meaning to the intuition that there should be a connection between Intuitionism and the theory of recursive functions (both theories stressing the importance of extracting information e ectively). He started to think about this in 1940 2 .
In order to appreciate the originality of his thinking, one should recall that the formal system of intuitionistic arithmetic HA did not exist at the time Well, : : : there is a system closely resembling HA in G odel's paper 28]. Kleene appears to have been at least initially unaware of this, for although his 1945 paper gives the reference, the retrospective survey stresses that \Heyting Arithmetic : : : ] does not occur as a subsystem readily separated out from Heyting's full system of intuitionistic mathematics", and quotes Kleene's own formalism, which later appeared in 52], as the thing he had in mind].
As an example of a precise connection between Intuitionism and the theory of recursive functions, Kleene starts by conjecturing a weak form of Church's Rule: if a closed formula of the form 8x9y'(x; y) is provable in intuitionistic number theory, then there must be a general recursive function F such that for all n, the formula '(n; F(n)) is true. One arrives at this conjecture by unravelling the meaning that such a statement must have for an intuitionist.
Conjecturing this, at a time when Intuitionism was still clouded by Brouwer's mysticism, the formal system in question hardly established, and the content of the conjecture blatantly false for Peano Arithmetic, was imaginative indeed! But, this was still far away from the actual development of Realizability. Often, one encounters the opinion that Realizability was inspired by the socalled \Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation" (an attempt to clarify the constructive meaning of the logical operations). This was not the case. Kleene starts by quoting Hilbert and Bernays ( 38] ). They, in their \Grundlagen der Mathematik", explain the \ nitist" position in Mathematics. The relevant passage is the one about \existential statements as incomplete communications", which, since it is philosophy, can only be appropriately understood in the original German:
Ein Existenzsatz uber Zi ern, also ein Satz von der Form \es gibt eine Zi er n von der Eigenschaft A(n)" ist nit aufzufassen als ein \Partialurteil", d.h. als eine unvollst andige Mitteilung einer genauer bestimmten Aussage, welche entweder in der direkten Angabe einer Zi er von der Eigenschaft A(n) oder der Angabe eines Verfahrens zur Gewinnung einer solchen Zi er besteht : : : ]. 3 Kleene then asks: \Can we generalize this idea to think of all 4 (except, trivially, the simplest) intuitionistic statements as incomplete communications?" 5 He outlines in which sense every logical sentence is \incomplete" and what would constitute its \completion". For the implication case, Kleene interestingly says that rst he tried an inductive clause inspired by \Heyting's proof-interpretation' ", but that it \didn't work" and so, \Heyting's proofinterpretation failed to help me to my goal" 6 . Since Kleene doesn't reveal what this rst try was, we are free to conjecture. It is just conceivable that he tried: a realizer for A ! B is a partial recursive function which sends proofs of A to proofs of B.
Kleene's realizability was, at least conceptually, a major advance. Its achievement is not so much a philosophical explanation of the intuitionistic connectives. Troelstra ( 93] , p.188) says: \it cannot be said to make the intended meaning of the logical operators more precise. As a \philosophical reduction" of the interpretation of the logical operators it is also only moderately successful; e.g. negative formulae are essentially interpreted by themselves." In fact, Kleene admits this explicitly in his 1945 paper 7 . On the other hand, by providing an interpretation which can be read and checked by the classical mathematician, he did put forward an interpretation of the intuitionistic connectives in terms of the classical ones (this, in contrast to the so-called BHK or \proof"-interpretation, which interprets the intuitionistic connectives in terms of themselves) 8 .
More importantly, realizability, as it is designed to handle \information" about formulas rather than proofs, already hints at the role Intuitionism would come to play in theoretical Computer Science some 40 years later: it foreshadows the view of intuitionistic formulas as datatypes, and intuitionistic logic as the logic of information. 3 An existential statement about numbers, i.e. a statement of the form \there exists a number n with property A(n)" is nitistically taken as a \partial judgement", that is, as an incomplete rendering of a more precisely determined proposition, which consists in either giving directly a number n with the property A(n), or a procedure by which such a number can be found :: : ] 4 my italics 5 It is, however, fair to say that Hilbert and Bernays did not limit their treatment of the nitist position to existential statements; they had a lot more to say, and also included negations and 89-statements in their account 6 In the words of 95] vol. I,p.9, the Heyting proof interpretation clause for implication is:
\A proof of A ! B is a construction which transforms any hypothetical proof of A into a proof of B" 7 \The analysis which leads to this truth de nition is not to be regarded as more than a partial analysis of the intuitionistic meaning of the statements : : : ]" (x2) 8 Again quoting 95] vol.I,p.9:\ :: : it is not hard to show that, on a very \classical" interpretation of construction and mapping, Heyting's clauses] justify the principles of two-valued (classical) logic."
But the scope of realizability is wider than just \interpreting the logic". Realizability also provides models for theories which are classically inconsistent, models therefore whose internal logic is strictly non-classical (important examples are: Brouwer's theory of Choice Sequences; parts of (suitably formalized) recursive analysis; set-theoretic interpretations of the polymorphic -calculus; Synthetic Domain Theory). It is in some of these models, that the statement \Realizability is equivalent to truth" can be given a precise meaning. And for the intuitionist, (an abstract form of) realizability does represent the intuitionistic connectives faithfully, as follows from 97].
Realizability and Glued Realizability
In this and the next section, I introduce Realizability and some of its most important variations, which I call \glued Realizability" (the term \gluing" has its mathematical origin in Algebraic Geometry; here, I use it loosely to mean \welding two interpretations together". There is a precise connection between the two meanings of the word, provided by Topos Theory; see section 2.1).
My treatment will not be entirely faithful to history; as often in Mathematics, the chronological order is not always the most systematic way of presenting things. However I'll do my best to sketch the history as I go along.
As The acronym HA stands for Heyting Arithmetic, the formal system of intuitionistic rst-order arithmetic.
Suppose now, that P is a set of sentences of the language of HA, such that P contains every theorem of HA and moreover, if both and ! are elements of P then so is . Important examples of such P are: the set of all theorems of HA (the minimal P), the set of all arithmetical sentences (the maximal P), and the set of all sentences true in some model M of HA.
The de nition of \n realizes-P " is similar in structure to that of \n realizes "; it has the same inductive clauses except for: 4 0 : n realizes-P ( ! ) if and only if ( ! ) is an element of P and n is the G odel number of a partial recursive function F such that for each m which realizes-P , F(m) is de ned and realizes-P ; 6 0 : n realizes-P a universal statement 8x (x) if and only if 8x (x) is an element of P and n is the G odel number of a total recursive function F such that for all numbers m, F(m) realizes-P (m).
I call the notion \realizes-P" glued realizability w.r.t. P. Note that ordinary realizability is glued realizability w.r.t. the maximal choice of P (a trivial gluing), so it su ces to formulate results for the \realizes-P" notion. The basic theorem is:
If HA` then there is a number n such that n realizes-P .
Moreover, if there is a number n such that n realizes-P , then 2 P.
An easy consequence of this theorem is, that there are formulas (x) with one free variable x, such that the sentence :8x( (x)_: (x)) is consistent with HA.
It also follows, that the rule of \double-negation shift":
8x:: (x) ! ::8x (x) is not a derived rule of HA ( 51] ).
In 51] only two forms of gluing are considered: the minimal gluing (which is called`-realizability) and the maximal one (ordinary realizability). From the minimal gluing, Kleene obtained the Weak Church's Rule mentioned in 1.1: if 8x9y (x; y) is a theorem of HA, then for some total recursive function G one has that for all n, (n; G(n)) is a theorem of HA, and hence true. This is in 51]. Incidentally, this result might also have been obtained by gluing with the set of all (classically) true arithmetical sentences.
As a corollary of this proof, one obtains the Existence Property for HA: if HA`9x (x) then for some n, HA` (n). And similarly, the Disjunction Property: if HA` _ then HA` or HA` . These conclusions are not explicitly in 51] , contrary to what Kleene later said 9 . 9 The rst proof of the Existence and Disjunction properties for HA was given by Harrop
Formalized Realizability and q-realizability
The de nition of Realizability involves only rst-order properties of indices of partial recursive functions. The predicate T(e; x; y) (y codes a computation with program e on input x) and the function U(y) (the output of the computation y codes) are primitive recursive and hence representable in HA; I'll use T and U also for the representing formulas, treating them as a relation symbol (function symbol) of HA.
Therefore, as was immediately seen by Kleene, realizability can be formalized in HA itself. This is already in 51]; the details are in 71].
I shall abbreviate 9zT(x; y; z) by xy#, and denote by xy also U(z), if T(x; y; z).
The following presentation of formalized (glued) realizability is based on Troelstra's 93]. Suppose that for each formula A a formula P(A) is speci ed, such that P(A) has at most the same free variables as A, and moreover: P1) HA`A ) HA`P(A), for sentences A; P2) HA`(P(A)^P(A ! B)) ! P(B) for all A; B; P3) HA`F ! P(F) for all atomic formulas F.
Then de ne for each formula a formula`x realizes-P ' which has one extra free variable x, as follows:
1. x realizes-P F is x = x^F, if F is an atomic formula;
2. x realizes-P ^ is ((x) 0 realizes-P )^((x) 1 realizes-P ) where ( ) 0 and ( ) 1 are the projection functions corresponding to h ; i; 3. x realizes-P ( ! ) is P( ! )^8y(y realizes-P ! xy#^xy realizes-P );
4. x realizes-P 9y (y) is (x) 1 realizes-P ((x) 0 ); 5. x realizes-P 8y (y) is P(8y (y))^8y(xy#^xy realizes-P (y)). As is well-known, disjunction is de nable in arithmetic: _ is provably equivalent to 9x((x = 0 ! )^(x 6 = 0 ! )). Therefore, a realizability clause for disjunction is not needed. One has the theorem:
If HA` then HA`9x(x realizes-P ); moreover, HA`9x(x realizes-P ) ! P( ). although there is a q-version for \analysis" in 57]. The reader will nd that q-realizability looks di erent from the presentation above, in these sources; the form presented here is equivalent, but has nicer proof-theoretic properties and was rst given by Grayson ( 31] ).
The Logic of Realizability
Kleene's original conjecture that realizability might mirror intuitionistic reasoning faithfully, was disproved: Rose ( 79] ) and later Ceitin, gave examples of propositional formulas that are realizable (even \absolutely": there is a number n which realizes every substitution instance of the formula, where one substitutes HA-sentences for the propositional variables), but not provable in the intuitionistic calculus 10 . The \predicate logic of realizability" is quite complicated, and was investigated by the Russian Plisko in a series of papers. Of course, there are several ways to de ne what it means for a formula in predicate logic to be \realizable". An interesting theorem ( 74] ) of his concerns what he calls \absolutely realizable predicate formulas". Consider a purely relational formula ' = ' P 1 ; : : : ; P k ] with all predicate symbols shown, P i being n i -ary. Say that a sentence ' of purely relational predicate logic is absolutely realizable if there is a number n such that for all k-tuples (F 1 ; : : : ; F k ), n realizes ' relative to (F 1 ; : : : ; F k ). The theorem is that the logic of absolutely realizable predicate formulas is 1 1 -complete.
However, the logic of realizability can be viewed in a di erent light. Making use of formalized realizability, one can consider the collection of (say, propositional) formulas ' such that every arithmetical substitution instance (again, by substituting HA-sentences for the propositional variables) is provably realized in HA. This notion can be formalized in second-order intuitionistic arithmetic HAS 11 . Gavrilenko ( 27] ) has the interesting theorem: suppose ' is a propositional formula with the property that HAS proves that every arithmetical 10 Ceitin's example is: :(p 1^p2 )^(:p 1 ! q 1 _ q 2 )^(:p 2 ! q 1 _ q 2 )] ! (:p 1 ! q 1 ) _ (:p 1 ! q 2 ) _ (:p 2 ! q 1 ) _ (:p 2 ! q 2 )] 11 One needs second-order, since it involves a truth de nition for G odel numbers of formulas substitution instance of it is realizable. Then ' is a theorem of intuitionistic propositional logic 12 . Anticipating further developments, I mention here the following theorem of my own ( 97] ): let HA + be an expansion of HA by new constants k and s, a partial binary function (or ternary relation which is singlevalued) and axioms saying that this structure is a partial combinatory algebra (see section 1.6 for a de nition). One can de ne realizability with respect to this. Suppose that ' is a purely relational predicate formula all of whose arithmetical substitution instances are realizable in this abstract sense, provably in HA + . Then ' is provable in the intuitionistic predicate calculus.
Axiomatization of Realizability
As we have seen, the logic of Realizability is too complicated to axiomatize. Quite di erent is the situation for formalized realizability. The formulas x realizes A all have a syntactic property: they are (up to equivalence) almost negative, that is: built from 0 1 -formulas using only^, ! and 8. Conversely, if A is an almost negative formula, there is a \partial term" t A (an expression of arithmetic expressing a {possibly non-terminating { computation; see 94] for details), containing the same free variables as A, such that the equivalence A $ t A #^t A realizes A is provable in HA (\t A #" means that the computation represented by t A terminates). This was observed by Kleene in 54] .
Exploiting the idempotency of the formalized realizability translation, one can then prove that formalized realizability is axiomatized by the scheme: 8x(A(x) ! 9yB(x; y)) ! 9e8x(A(x) ! 9y(T(e; x; y)^B(x; U(y))))
where A(x) must be an almost negative formula. This scheme is called Extended Church's Thesis (ECT 0 ) 13 . The exact formulation of the axiomatization is: i)
HA`9x(x realizes ') , HA + ECT 0`' The same axiomatization holds true if HA is augmented by Markov's Principle MP: 8x(A(x)_:A(x)) ! (::9xA(x) ! 9xA(x)). These axiomatization results were obtained, independently, by Dragalin ( 21] ) and Troelstra ( 92] ; see also 93] for a thorough exposition). 12 Regrettably, recently Albert Visser and the author discovered that Gavrilenko's proof contains a gap. Nevertheless we remain convinced that his theorem is true, and that the proof can be patched 13 A very debatable choice of name. It has nothing to do with Church's informal Thesis, which says that every intuitively computable function is recursive. In the Metamathematics of intuitionistic arithmetic, \Church's Thesis" stands for the formal statement which expresses that all functions from numbers to numbers are recursive. However, from the perspective of higher order arithmetic, the scheme ECT 0 not only strengthens this but it also incorporates a choice principle Let us look at a minor application. Obviously, Markov's Principle is an example of a predicate logical scheme which is intuitionistically underivable. But one can prove that the following scheme:
is derivable in HA + MP + ECT 0 . So one sees that the introduction of realizability in uences the predicate logic, at least if MP is assumed 14 .
Another application is, that the scheme IP of Independence of Premisses:
(:A ! 9yB) ! 9y(:A ! B) (y not free in B) is not derivable in HA, since it is easily shown to be inconsistent with ECT 0 ( 93] In Kleene's de nition of function realizability, there is a twist: one has realizability clauses like for number realizability (using functions as realizers), but at the end one says that a formula is`realizable', provided there is a recursive function realizing the formula. This is a notion that later was called \relative realizability" in a generalized setting (see 2.5).
A n is an actual realizer of an implication ! if n is the G odel number of a partial recursive function which sends every actual realizer of to an 17 in a footnote!actual realizer of , and every potential realizer of to a potential realizer of .
Features of HRO-modi ed realizability for HA are that it validates the scheme IP (see the last paragraph of 1.5) and refutes Markov's Principle. By a q-version of this realizability one can obtain an IP-rule for HA (I believe this was rst noticed in 96]). Beeson ( 4] ) applies modi ed realizability to show that although, in formalizations of elementary recursion theory, the Myhill-Shepherdson and Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoen eld theorems seem to require Markov's Principle, they don't conversely imply it, for these theorems hold under modi ed realizability.
The idea of actual and potential realizers can of course be applied to different partial combinatory algebras, and was so, by Kleene (\special realizability" in 59]) and Joan Moschovakis ( 70] ). Moschovakis shows the consistency of Kleene and Vesley's \Basic System" of intuitionistic analysis together with the scheme (:A ! 9 B( )) ! 9 (:A ! B( )) and the scheme 9 A( ) ! 9 (GR( )^A( )) for closed 9 A( ) (the formula GR( ) expresses that is recursive. That this is a nontrivial result, is apparent from the fact that the \Basic System" contains the axiom scheme of so-called \Bar Induction"{a principle of induction over de nable well-founded trees{, which fails badly for the recursive universe). She uses the partial combinatory algebra of functions together with its subalgebra of recursive functions; recent work of Birkedal et al ( 3] ; see also section 2.5) is closely related to hers (the relationship is made precise in 11]). In general, as shown e.g. in 100], modi ed realizability interpretations are also intimately connected with what the author of these lines has called \Kripke models of realizability" ( 96] ); see next section.
Recently, modi ed realizability has enjoyed renewed interest, mainly by the e orts of Thomas Streicher, Martin Hyland and Luke Ong ( 88] , 45]; see also 100] and 11]).
For an extension of formalized Kleene-realizability to second-order arithmetic HAS, see 93] . Troelstra shows that the following principle of secondorder arithmetic is valid under his extension: UP 8X9nA(X; n) ! 9n8XA(X; n)
The initials UP stand for Uniformity Principle. This principle received much attention in connection with the E ective Topos: see sections 2.1 and 2.2. Saying that every function from sets of numbers to numbers must be constant, it is very non-classical; however, it can be shown that HAS + UP has no non-classical rst-order consequences ( 96] ).
Kripke Models of Realizability
This is really a prelude to a general topos-theoretic account of realizability. But topos theory was slow to catch up with realizability, and long after the logical signi cance of toposes had been grasped, it was not yet clear what toposes could do for realizability.
A Kripke model of realizability is a Kripke model of the theory APP, that
is: a system of partial combinatory algebras (A p ) p2P indexed by some partially ordered set P, together with maps A p ! A q for p q, satisfying the usual conditions. As a simple example, take the partial order f0 < 1g, let A 1 the pca of function realizability and A 0 its sub-pca of recursive functions. One can also take: A 1 the graph model P(!) and A 0 its subalgebra on the r.e. subsets of IN.
See section 2.5 for more about this. In general, if (A p ) p2P is a Kripke model of realizability, to any formula ' a P-indexed system ( ' ] ] p ) p2P of sets of realizers is assigned (which is a subset of (A p ) p2P in the sense of Kripke models).
The rst example I know of such a Kripke model of realizability, is the unpublished paper 18]. De Jongh wished to establish the theorem that a formula A is provable in intuitionistic predicate calculus if and only if each of its arithmetical substitutions is provable in HA. He succeeded partially: the full theorem was rst proved by Leivant in his thesis (and Leivant used proof theory). In 97] I was able to revive De Jongh's original realizability method to prove the full theorem.
Another example occurs in Goodman's 29]. The models of De Jongh and Goodman are strikingly similar: in both cases, A p is the set of indices of functions partial recursive in some set X p IN, with X p X q for p q. However, Goodman, whose aim was to interpret a version of HA ! with decidable equality at all types, also brings the ::-translation into the picture, so strictly speaking his model transcends the de nition of a Kripke model of realizability, and might rather be called a (generalized) Beth model of realizability.
Much work on combinations of realizability with Kripke forcing was done by Jim Lipton ( 62] , 63]).
Extensional Realizability
\Extensional realizability" de nes not just realizers, but simultaneously an equivalence relation on them; the idea is that a realizer for an implication A ! B should send equivalent realizers for A to equivalent realizers for B.
The origin is, of course, again Kreisel's modi ed realizability; just as HRO is a model for HA ! which is de nable in HA, we have the models HEO of`hereditarily e ective operations' and HRO E , the extensional collapse of HRO (see 93] ). HEO in combination with modi ed realizability is already considered in Troelstra ( 93] ), but the rst extensional realizability for HA ! , in combination with Kripke forcing, was used by Beeson ( 5] ), who extended Goodman's theorem to the statement that E ? HA ! + AC is conservative over HA.
The rst time a de nition for extensional realizability appeared in print that was suitable for rst-order arithmetic, was in Pitts' thesis ( 73] ) 19 .
Extensional realizability was used by Beeson ( 6] and 7]) in connection with Martin-L of's Type Theory, and by Diller, Troelstra and Renardel ( 20] , 75]). Martin Hyland studied extensional realizability from a topos-theoretic point of 19 According to Pitts, the idea came from Robin Gandy view, and noted its salient higher-order logical properties in 47] (see also the next chapter).
In 99], two versions of extensional realizability for HA, analogous to HEO and HRO E , are compared and found non-equivalent. It is shown that the HEOversion is not idempotent, but nevertheless an axiomatization for this realizability is obtained over a conservative extension of HA. The usual Troelstra-type results are obtained: a q-version is de ned, and an \Extensional Church's Rule" for HA is derived.
The period 1980-2000
Around 1970, Lawvere and Tierney had generalized Grothendieck's notion of \topos" to the de nition of elementary topos; in subsequent work they (and also others, like Michael Barr and Peter Freyd) had shown that very many results in the theory of Grothendieck topoi can in fact be derived from the axioms for an elementary topos. An impressive account of elementary topos theory (I mean`theory of elementary toposes'; the theory itself is at places far from`elementary') of the seventies, which has served as a standard reference to this day, is Johnstone's 48].
Logicians discovered that toposes generalized semantical ideas that had developed in the sixties: Cohen forcing for ZF set theory (later, by Solovay 20 reformulated in terms of Boolean-valued models 21 ), Kripke and Beth models for intuitionistic predicate logic, and topological models. All these semantics fall, from the point of view of a topos theorist, under the header \localic toposes", or to use a more familiar term for logicians: Heyting-valued semantics.
Denis Higgs ( 36] , 37]) had proved in 1973 that the category of`H-valued sets' is equivalent to the topos of sheaves over H, for a complete Heyting algebra H. So Kripke semantics, topological semantics etc. have a natural extension to higher-order languages 22 . This is important for the development of intuitionistic elementary mathematics: the real numbers are constructed by Dedekind cuts which needs second-order arithmetic (logicians had been describing models for analysis, completely independent of second-order arithmetic). It seems that no one in the traditional logicians' world of the seventies was more in uential in pushing topos semantics than Dana Scott. Martin Hyland has testi ed 23 that Scott's coming to Oxford in the mid-seventies meant a \change in ways of doing logic". Much of this can probably be attributed to a di erent cultural background: most of all, the model theorist Scott advocated the view of realizability (and other`interpretations') as models, to be treated as syntax-free as possible.
Anyway, the reader who wishes to see a representative sample of work from the seventies on sheaf models, is referred to the \Durham Proceedings" ( 24] ). All this work concerns Grothendieck topoi however, and realizability was markedly absent. In fact, what did one know about non-Grothendieck topoi? Finite sets (not very entertaining); and yes; the Lawvere/Tierney axioms are su ciently algebraic to ensure that a free topos exists; but what did one know about it? Finally, there were the toposes arising by the so-called lter-quotient construction which had been used to give topos-theoretic proofs of Cohen's independence results. It was well-known, and amply demonstrated in Fourman and Scott's paper 25] that Boolean-valued sets generalize to Heyting-valued sets for a complete Heyting algebra. The completeness of the algebra is used for interpretation of the quanti ers. Now in 25], Fourman and Scott had dissected the construction of the topos of H-sets into two, logically meaningful steps. First, one has a model of many-sorted intuitionistic predicate logic without equality. The predicates of sort X (where X is a set) are functions from X into the set of propositions H. Since H itself exists as a sort, one has in fact second-order propositional logic too. The next step is adding equality as a general H-valued symmetric and transitive (but not necessarily re exive!) relation, and considering all possible such. One obtains a topos, and the validity of a formula ' in the internal logic of this topos is connected to the validity in the underlying model of many-sorted predicate logic of a translation of ' into the \logic of identity and existence" ( 84] ).
The e ective topos
Hyland, Johnstone and Pitts discovered a useful generalization of the rst step in this construction, calling it`tripos' for`topos-representing indexed preordered set' 24 . The`Theory of triposes' is the subject matter of Andy Pitts' thesis 73], but a major application of the idea is the`e ective topos', discovered by Martin Hyland and described in the classic paper 40] . Let the`domain of propositions' be the powerset of IN. For any set X, the set of predicates on X i.e. the set P(IN) X is preordered by: ' if and only if there is a partial recursive function F such that for each x 2 X and each n 2 '(x), F(n) is de ned and F(n) 2 (x). Then P(IN) X is a Heyting (pre)algebra, and although it is not complete, adjoints to the map P(IN) f : P(IN) Y ! P(IN) X (for functions f : X ! Y ) exist. One can mimick the the construction of the topos of H-valued sets completely, and one gets the E ective topos Eff.
In Eff, the standard truth de nition for rst-order arithmetic (based on the natural numbers object) is equivalent to Kleene's 1945-realizability. But 24`T ripos' is also the name of the major Mathematics exam at the University of Cambridge. A typical Cambridge pun, in more than one way much more is true: standard second-order arithmetic in Eff is captured by an informal reading of Troelstra's realizability for HAS (as shown in 96]), and standard analysis in Eff (using the Dedekind reals) turns out to be equivalent to Bishop-style recursive analysis. The nite type structure over the natural numbers is the structure HEO. All these di erent, hitherto unrelated bits of research fell into their right place.
Even more strikingly, also the proof-theoretic results obtained by realizability received a wider signi cance in the e ective topos. The role of the almost negative formulas is explained by the fact that the category of Sets in contained in Eff as \::-sheaves" (see the section \Basic facts from the logic of sheaves"
In a little series of never-published, hand-written notes, Robin Grayson ( 31], 33], 32]) gave accounts of results obtained, independently, by Hyland and himself. He described the construction of toposes for modi ed and extensional realizability. He explained the topos-theoretic counterpart of q-realizability. By gluing the toposes Sets and Eff along the embedding (see 102] for this construction) one gets a topos corresponding to a sort of q-realizability. Replacing Sets by the free topos (with natural numbers object) F and constructing Eff over F, one obtains versions of existence properties for higher-order intuitionistic arithmetic HAH and Church's Rule for HAH 25 . Let us sketch the argument for Church's Rule. So F is the free topos, Eff(F) the e ective topos constructed over it, and E the gluing of F to Eff(F). The satisfaction relation E j = ' can be expressed in F. Now suppose HAH`8x : N9y : N (x; y), so E j = 8x9y .
By the realizability construction, we have F j = 9f : N8x : N9y : N(T(f; x; y)^E j = (x; U(y))) Now there is a logical functor E ! F (a general feature of the gluing construction), whence F j = 9f : N8x : N9y : N(T(f; x; y)^ (x; U(y))) so HAH proves this formula, and we are done. 26 In the beautiful recent paper 43], Martin Hyland sketches various ideas for applications of the topos-theoretic point of view to di erent interpretations, in particular Martin-L of's Type Theory, and the Dialectica Interpretation.
Modest Sets and Internal Completeness
In his paper 40], Hyland had singled out an interesting subcategory of Eff:
the subcategory on what he called`e ective objects'. This category generalizes 25 The existence property for HAH was rst proved by Lambek and Ph.Scott in 1978, using Friedman-style q-realizability. That this was essentially a gluing construction, was realized by Peter Freyd, who appears to have been surprised by the fact that in F the terminal object is indecomposable and projective, but nevertheless gave an algebraic proof of it. For good or ill, Freyd's proof was again syntacticized by Lambek and Ph.Scott in 61] Er sov's \Numerierungen" ( 22] ): it is equivalent to the category whose objects are pairs (X; ) with X a set and : A ! X a surjective function from a subset of IN to X; morphisms (X; ) ! (Y; ) are functions f : X ! Y such that for some partial recursive function F, F(n) is de ned for all n 2 dom( ) and F(n) 2 dom( ) and f( (n)) = (F(n)). Abstractly the e ective objects are (in Eff) ::-separated quotients of subobjects of N. The concrete representation just given, was later called the category of modest sets by Dana Scott ( 85] ).
Hyland noticed that the e ective objects allow an interesting generalization of Troelstra's Uniformity Principle (see section 1.6) . Recall that Sets is included in Eff as ::-sheaves. Now any function from a quotient of a set to an e ective object is necessarily constant in Eff; in fact, for an e ective object A and a quotient B of a set, the diagonal embedding A ! A B is an isomorphism.
Around 1985, Moggi and Hyland made an important discovery. This`Uniformity Principle' meant that a speci c internal category in Eff (basically, the internal full subcategory of separated subquotients of N) was complete in a sense, without being a preorder 27 .
This meant several things. For example, Scott used it in 85] to show that intuitionistically it may happen that a set A is in bijective correspondence with 2 2 A 28 . It could also be used to obtain a set-theoretic interpretation of Girard's second-order -calculus F 29 .
The precise meaning of`complete' (this is not expressible in the internal language of the topos) took a while to sort out. A basic observation came from Freyd: take the property that A ! A B is an isomorphism for each set B (in fact, just the set 2 will su ce; but note the set 2, not the object 2 in Eff!) as a de ning property A can have; call A`discrete' if it has this property. Eventually, Hyland, Robinson and Rosolini showed that the discrete objects, as a bration over Eff, are complete, and weakly equivalent to the bration obtained by`externalizing' the aforementioned internal category in Eff; from this, it follows that the internal category is`weakly complete' 30 . This is explained in 46] and 41].
Of course this does not mean that the category of modest sets is complete, as 77] and 82] hastened to point out. But it may serve very well for interpretations of theories in, say, system F and related programming languages such as Quest. Such`PER' models were constructed by Abadi, Cardelli, Longo, Freyd, Hyland, Robinson, Rosolini and many, many others; by now, PER models form a standard tool in the semantics of programming languages.
For historical reasons, quotients of sets are called`uniform objects'. The notions`uniform' and`discrete' can be applied to maps as well and give rise to 27 Contradicting a classical theorem of Peter Freyd 28 Contradicting Cantor's theorem 29 Contradicting a well-known result of Reynolds 30 Basically, the problem resides in the absence of choice in Eff. Call the internal category C. For an arbitrary other, say D, we have the object C D of diagrams in C of type D, and an object E of pairs (d; c) where d is a diagram, and c a limit for this diagram. The projection: E ! C D is an epimorphism in Eff, but there need not be a section of it, which would assign a limit to each diagram a factorization system on Eff very much in analogy with the`monotone-light' factorization system on the category of T 0 -topological spaces (see 14] ).
Important applications of the completeness of`pers' come from Synthetic Domain Theory (see section 2.6)
Realizability as a universal construction
The e ective topos has intriguing, not to say mystifying aspects. One way of attacking its mystery is to look for universal properties it may enjoy. Around 1990, two papers appeared with rather similar-looking constructions of Eff: 13] and 78]. The key word here is completion.
We have seen that the e ective topos is a two-step construction. But there are many ways in which to cover a distance by two steps : : :
Let us consider two completion processes: given a nite-limit category C one can add coproducts to it; or one can add stable quotients of equivalence relations to it, making it exact. The rst construction belongs to folklore and results in Fam(C): objects are families (C i ) i2I of objects of C indexed by a set Performing the two in succession gives (Fam(C)) ex=lex which is a topos, the topos Sets C op 31 . Now suppose one does not add all coproducts, just the recursive ones. That is, take Fam R (C): objects are now families indexed by a subset I of IN, and morphisms (C i ) i2I ! (D j ) j2J need a partial recursive function I ! J. The main result of 78] is: (Fam R (Sets)) ex=lex is a topos, the e ective topos. Note the mirroring in the two cases: for a Grothendieck topos, at least for presheaf toposes, one completes a small category with all coproducts indexed by Sets; for Eff, one completes Sets by coproducts indexed by a small category R! It follows from the general theory of ex/lex completions that the category Fam R (Sets) (into which Sets embeds) is equivalent to the full subcategory of projective objects of Eff; and moreover, that every object of Eff is a quotient of a projective object.
On the other hand, the construction of 13] presents Eff as (Asm) ex=reg ; that is, make Asm exact but preserve the regular structure, where Asm is the category of assemblies, the ::-separated objects of the e ective topos 32 . In a completely analogous way, the topos of sheaves over H (H a complete Heyting algebra) is (Fam(H)) ex=reg .
It is amusing to note that (Asm) ex=lex also yields a topos; now not the e ective topos, but a topos for extensional realizability (see 99]) 33 .
An interesting result in this area is due to John Longley ( 64] 34 . This category is`almost' an exact completion of the category of T 0 -topological spaces; in fact, it is the \regular completion" of T 0 -spaces ( 83] ).
The relationships between these various completions, and when they have nice properties (being locally cartesian closed or toposes) have been systematically studied by Mat as Menni in his thesis ( 68] ); obtaining a synthesis of all previous work in this area.
Axiomatization Revisited
In his seminal paper 40], Hyland had nished with the comment:
What we lack, above all : : : ] is any real information analogous to the results obtained in Troelstra ( 93] ) axiomatizing realizability : : : ] we have no good information in this area. We can not properly be said to understand realizability until we do.
Wasn't it about time, after 1990 and all these further results on Eff has appeared, to use them in order to obtain more \information in this area"?
In 98], the construction of a series of theories of higher order arithmetic (2nd,3rd, : : : order) is given, which are true in Eff, and realizabilities for these theories which are also true in Eff, and which can be axiomatized over the theories. This is based on the fact that in Eff, realizability can be de ned in such a way that in Eff, a sentence is equivalent to its own realizability. The details are worked out for 2nd and 3rd order arithmetic; the axioms characterizing the 2nd order realizability are Uniformity Principle, Extended Church's Thesis and Shanin's Principle which says that for any subset X of N there is a ::-closed subset A of N such that X = fx j 9yhx; yi 2 Ag For Shanin's Principle consult 30]. 34 I like \New Category" as a name, better than this category's o cial name, Equ, pronounced`Eek'. \New Category" is reminiscent of \New Foundations", \New Age" and \New Economy", making it a cool object of study
The construction of these theories is motivated by the fact that the relevant arithmetical objects are covered by de nable projective objects; e.g., N is covered by ( :: ) N ; that this is a cover is the content of Shanin's Principle.
A corollary of the treatment for 3rd order arithmetic is, that from the axioms which characterize its realizability, one can prove a completeness property of the category of modest sets.
Yet, we are a long way from understanding realizability axiomatically. We may ask the following question. For an arbitrary topos E with natural numbers object, let Eff(E) be the e ective topos constructed over it. The reader sees that the notion of relative realizability is very old: in fact, Kleene's function realizability from 59] (see section 1.6) is of this form. However, the analysis is quite nice. The relative situation can also be studied in connection with modi ed realizability, leading to a more complete understanding of Moschovakis' work. In 11], these relationships are made precise. We see, that the`logical functor' Eff A];A ! Eff A is a lter quotient situation, and we arrive at a very general de nition of`modi ed realizability' w.r.t. an internal pca in a topos E, and an open subtopos of E. 35 Recall that F denotes the free topos with natural numbers object 36 F is embedded as a full re ective subcategory in Eff(F), and the inclusion preserves epimorphisms; hence the re ection preserves projectives. Therefore, if Eff(F) is an exact completion then F has enough projectives; I don't know whether this is true Also the work of Thomas Streicher ( 89] ) deserves mention. He exploits relative realizability in order to obtain a topos for computable analysis.
Finally, note that the motivation of letting computable things act on noncomputable data, is reminiscent of Kleene's setup for higher-type recursive functionals ( 53] and later papers).
Non-classical Theories
A useful feature of Eff and related topoi is that in them one often nds models for inherently non-classical theories, theories which have no classical models (sometimes not even models in Grothendieck topoi).
Here I just point at a few interesting topics that deserve further research. Synthetic Domain Theory aims for a suitable category of objects which carry a natural domain structure, such that between these objects any map is automatically continuous. It was suggested by Dana Scott. Rosolini ( 81] ), at the time Scott's student, was the rst who made real progress in setting up the theory; later work was done by, among others, Hyland ( 42] ), Phoa ( 72] ), Taylor ( 91] ), and Streicher/Reus ( 76] ). In 101], the force of a truly axiomatic and rigorously internal approach is advocated. Algebraic Set Theory. In their elegant little book ( 49] ), Joyal and Moerdijk present a novel way of looking at set theory. They point to a model in Eff, which needs to be further investigated. Intuitionistic Nonstandard Arithmetic. Also for this, there are interesting models in Eff, as pointed out in ( 69] ). This must also de nitely be studied more closely.
